Learning and costs in airframe production: A multiple-output production function approach

This article examines the influence of both production rate and learning on airframe program costs. A dynamic multiple-output production model is developed and is used to observe the cost impact of changes in production rate and learning. Several simulations are performed to demonstrate the sensitivity of the optimal time path of cost to changes in the model parameters. The model is applied by estimating parameters from the F102 airframe program.     

The class of mifra lifetimes and its relation to other classes

In a previous paper, the authors have introduced a class of multivariate lifetimes (MIFRA) which generalize the univariate lifetimes with increasing failure rate average (IFRA). They have also shown that this class satisfies many fundamental properties. In this paper it is shown that other concepts of multivariate IFRA do not satisfy all of these properties. Relationships between MIFRA and these other concepts are given. Finally, positive dependence implications with respect to these classes are also discussed.     

Decision rules for attacking targets of opportunity

Frequently in warfare, a force is required to attack a perishable enemy target system - a target system where the targets are detected seemingly at random, and if not immediately attacked, will shortly escape from detection. A conflicting situation arises when an attack element detects a target of relatively low value and has to decide whether to expend his resources on that particular target or to wait for a more lucrative one, hoping one will be found. This paper provides a decision rule giving the least valued target that should be attacked as well as the resources that should be expended as a function of the attack element's remaining mission time.     

Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment

This article examines the Dhofar campaign in Oman (1965–75), and the role Britain played in assisting the Omani royal government against left-wing insurgents. Using existing secondary sources and declassified British government papers, it reassesses the contribution of British military advisers and special forces to the counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the balance between military action and civil affairs, the external dimension of the conflict, and intelligence and covert operations. It concludes by assessing whether the Dhofar War offers any guidance to Western armed forces involved in contemporary COIN campaigns such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.     

Contracting Out Security

Private security companies (PSCs) currently receive a great deal of attention in the news media, in sensationalist reporting, and increasingly in scholarly books and articles. While the scholarly books and articles make significant contributions to our understanding of this global phenomenon, there are several impediments to analysis that must be recognized and overcome if analysis is to be improved. Three of these impediments are reviewed in this article. The author suggests that US government material is currently available to minimize impediments and offers a framework to make analytical sense of it. Since contracting out is based on contracts, and unless the complexities of awarding and managing contracts are understood, recommendations made to reform the process of contracting out security are unrealistic.     

Evaluating insurgent/counterinsurgent performance

Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance ‘starts on the streets’, so to speak. Specifically, the five rules of assessment are common sense: (1) become familiar with the area in question; (2) slice up the analytical target into manageable slices; (3) carry out longitudinal studies; (4) look at the role played by ideas in this political warfare; and (5) assess the relationship between structural and purposive elements. Though various efforts have been made to quantify outcome, these have not been particularly successful and encourage emphasis upon process at the expense of analysis. The most common flaw in assessments is to view insurgency in static perspective. Societal causes are a necessary but not sufficient factor in upheaval. Once the insurgency becomes a going concern, organizational dynamics become important. Similar factors obtain on the counter‐insurgent side. In the end, both compete for domination of human terrain.     

The myth of Afghan electoral democracy: the irregularities of the 2014 presidential election

ABSTRACT

This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June ‘runoff election.’ As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country.